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Abstract
Japan was admitted to the United Nations (U.N.) in 1956; however, it was not 
until the late 1970s that Japan ratified any human rights conventions. By 1982, 
Japan had been elected to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UN-
HCR). Japan’s policies on human rights, particularly toward issues outside Japan, 
were almost non-existent until more recently, even though the Japanese Constitu-
tion upholds human rights as a core value. There are obvious polarised positions 
on Japan’s human rights (in)actions. For example the U.N. Special Rapporteur 
on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance concluded that “there is racial discrimination and xenophobia in Ja-
pan, and it affects three circles of discriminated groups: the national minorities… 
Koreans and Chinese… foreigners and migrants from… the rest of the world” and 
highlighted that the discrimination were of a social, economic, political, historical 
and cultural nature. The Japanese government, on the other hand, has denied the 
accusations and has argued that “Japan has taken all measures to combat racial 
discrimination”. This paper briefly examines human rights in Japan by addressing 
some of the issues in the “circles” identified by the U.N. Rapporteur. Human rights 
put Japan in an uncomfortable position; however, it would be erroneous to portray 
Japan as a country where human rights abuses akin to some of its Asian neigh-
bours abound. At the same time, much remains to be done to complete the transi-
tion to an open society where minorities and multiculturalism is both respected 
and promoted at all levels. Japan has the opportunity to convert the rhetoric into 
real action so other states can see the possibilities and follow the lead.
Introduction
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was introduced at the 
⃝ 論　文 ⃝
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United Nations (U.N.) at a time when Japan was still predominantly 
under U.S. Occupation after WWII. Japan played no part in draft-
ing the document although the Japanese government argued strongly 
against Occupational reforms that were based on assumptions in the 
Declaration.1 The government stated that “the centrality of the family 
needs to take precedence over the individual, rights have to be linked 
to duties, elimination of ascriptive-based social relationships results 
in anarchy, and rights cannot be considered absolute when there ex-
ists a threat to public welfare”.2 Added to this, Japan’s hesitancy to be 
a signatory to the Human Rights Covenants (International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and the International Covenant 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]) fuelled criticisms 
that Japan was trying to dismantle the reforms, a recurring theme on 
human rights in Japan. Japan was charged with “using cultural relativ-
ism as a cover for its defence on special interests through the tactics of 
stonewalling and paralysis of analysis”.3 The government has also been 
accused of failing to address the situation of domestic discrimination.4 
Some academics argue that human rights have always been an es-
sential part of Japanese culture by citing examples of how certain rules 
and customs are related to human rights.5 Yokota and Aoi highlight, 
however, that these customs were to teach rulers about good gover-
nance more than they were designed to promote human rights. Some 
provisions of the Meiji Constitution did provide for some human rights 
freedoms, such as Article 29 – the freedom of expression, or Article 28 
which discusses the freedom of religion, but they were on the whole still 
subject to the Emperor. Moreover, the Meiji Constitutional freedoms 
were “only applicable to Japanese”6 (my emphasis as the Buraku people 
were already at this time considered less than Japanese). As a result, 
“foreigners in Japanese territories or non-Japanese residents in ter-
ritories under Japanese military occupation did not ipso facto enjoy the 
constitutional rights and freedoms”.7 History has shown the results: 
many Koreans and Chinese suffered serious human rights offences 
from the Japanese military and officials. 
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After WWII, the Constitution was redrafted and the emperor was 
deprived of nearly all his political powers. The new Constitution pro-
vides for greater freedoms and human rights, with several worthy of 
special mention. Firstly, Article 11 highlights that “The people shall 
not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. 
These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Con-
stitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future genera-
tions as eternal and inviolate rights.” Article 13 states that “All of the 
people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere 
with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and 
in other governmental affairs”. Thirdly, Article 14(1): “All of the people 
are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in politi-
cal, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status 
or family origin; (my emphasis)” and Article 26(1): “All people shall 
have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their 
ability, as provided for by law”. I therefore find it difficult to agree with 
the current legal interpretation of the Constitution that the provisions 
therein are only to be enjoyed by those the government deems to be 
recognised as “Japanese”. Simply, at what point does “…no discrimina-
tion in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, 
social status or family origin…” become semantically reduced to read “no 
discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of being 
Japanese”?
The new Constitution contains provisions for the protection of hu-
man rights through (a) basic freedoms, (b) civil and political rights, 
and (c) economic, social and cultural rights.8 Arudou argues that “the 
Constitution of Japan guarantees fundamental human rights to foreign 
residents in Japan except the rights which, owing to their nature, are 
interpreted to be applicable only to Japanese nationals (my emphasis). 
Thus, the Government actively pursues the goals of (1) ensuring equal 
rights and opportunities for foreigners, (2) respecting foreigners’ own 
cultures and values, and (3) promoting mutual understanding to realize 
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a society in which Japanese and foreigners can live together comfort-
ably”.9 In 1999, a Japanese court ruled that non-Japanese are protected 
by the U.N. convention against racial discrimination, which Japan 
signed in 1996.10 Hadfield reported in USA Today that to the surprise 
of Japan’s legal community, Judge So followed the U.N. guidelines in 
the absence of domestic laws banning discrimination.11 In a more recent 
case, however, the Supreme Court upheld district and high court rul-
ings in favour of the government and against the plaintiffs (a Japanese 
citizen and two non-Japanese citizens) who sued a local municipality for 
not enforcing anti-discrimination practices at a local bathhouse that re-
fused entry to non-Japanese. The court argued that a local city munici-
pality does not have any obligation to institute ordinances to ban such 
discrimination and added: “The convention has only general, abstract 
provisions recommending appropriate measures to eliminate racial dis-
crimination, and the Otaru government does not have any obligation to 
institute ordinances to ban such discrimination.”12 As others before me 
have also stated,13 it is one thing to have the legal provisions for human 
rights; it is quite another to enforce them. 
I will outline in this paper that Japan, at the national level, has 
implemented many international human rights provisions and laws; 
however, the enforcement, education and establishment of these at the 
regional and social level are unsatisfactory – especially toward minority 
groups, which include the Ainu, Koreans (or zainichi), the Buraku (or 
Dowa), and to some resident foreigners. The reasons that account for 
this are complex as they involve historical, economical, cultural and so-
cial factors. The mixed signals are indeed confusing. Clearly, there are 
double standards forthcoming from the Diet and the elite bureaucratic 
system that supports it.
Human Rights Declarations
For Japan, the U.N. became a source for its own legitimacy, to 
which it was admitted in 1956. In 1957, at the opening address to 
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parliament, then Foreign Minister Kishi Nobusuke set the course for 
Japan’s basic diplomatic policy, which was to be centred on the U.N. in 
collaboration with other nations, but Japan was to remain a member of 
Asia;14 however, in 1961, Japan declared that its primary goal was to 
maintain its status as a member of the Western democracies.15 All that 
meant was that Japan would conduct itself in line with the principles 
and objectives of the Japanese Constitution, which albeit being similar 
to the U.N. Charter, are not “read” and “applied” in the same spirit. 
Contrary to the official declarations and public façade, Japanese diplo-
macy has been far from U.N-centric or based on a U.N-centred diploma-
cy: “Japan’s attitude… has been ambivalent and pragmatic, generally 
consistent with a minimalist approach to the conduct of foreign policy 
and the pursuit of national interests”.16 This policy began to change 
around the time of the first Iraq War when it became necessary to use 
the U.N. as a political asset – arguable because the U.N. had become 
popular amongst the Japanese people. Japan’s geographical position is 
in Asia, but its alignment with the West creates a mixed identity at the 
U.N. This is both an asset and a liability.17 
Human rights have been presented as one of the “pillars” of West-
ern democracy: the antithesis of the non-democratic regimes that are 
seen to suppress such freedoms; but they have put Japan in an awk-
ward position. 
Japan ratified the ICCPR in 1978 and the ICESCR in 1979, but 
their reservations (e.g. Article 8 of ICESCR and Article 22 of ICCPR) 
have further fuelled beliefs that Japan is not serious about reform 
and human rights. Criticism of Japan’s inaction on domestic issues is 
often made toward the rights of the Ainu, Koreans and other foreign 
residents and migrant workers (e.g. by the Japanese Workers’ Com-
mittee for Human Rights - JWCHR). The JWCHR reports that human 
rights have been neglected in the workplace including labour rights 
infringements and discrimination,18 and they argue that the Japanese 
government has not “resolved the cases of war-time comfort women, 
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of relocation and labour enforced on Chinese and Korean people…”19 
Take for example the governments “strong recommendation/law” that 
companies cannot discriminate against non-Japanese employees, yet 
the same government openly applies discriminatory policies restricting 
the promotion of non-Japanese employees and in the positions they can 
hold.20 Indeed, Tokyo’s policies and practices toward minority groups 
are confusing.
At the time of Japan’s admission to the U.N., the U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights’ (UNCHR) role was relatively “tame” but even so, 
Japan chose not to be represented on it, even following direct appeals 
by other nations. Japan’s election to the UNCHR in 1982 is a reflection 
of its participation in human rights mechanisms (and the U.N. gener-
ally) during the eighties.21 At the same time, Japan began to play a 
major role in human rights issues, and it also began to claim that its 
financial contributions to the U.N. meant that it should be considered 
for inclusion as a permanent member of the Security Council.22 Japan’s 
foreign [and domestic] policy toward human rights was almost non-
existent until then and it avoided taking political risks as a matter of 
general principle. Japan’s attitude was generally “active in providing 
defence against possible criticism of its own domestic human rights 
record and in reminding other states that human rights issues are es-
sentially internal matters”.23 Usually this tension led (and continues 
to lead) the accused state to accuse the accuser of interference in do-
mestic affairs.24 Japan is in an awkward position because of its human 
rights policies as it is aware of the potential for accusation of domestic 
interference by other Asian countries25. Japan’s strategy is therefore 
aimed at maintaining “good political relations with other Asian nations 
over the protection of individual rights… [although Japan] in general 
upholds the concepts and principles of human rights… its approach… 
has been selective and country-specific.”26 Japan’s massive bureaucracy 
has begun to address some of the domestic human rights concerns, but 
the reality is that the current bureaucratic elite in Tokyo remains fo-
cused predominantly on economic self-interest. Until the recent global 
53
Waseda Global Forum No. 6, 2009, 47–74
economic downturn, the officials were seemingly softening their atti-
tudes, no doubt in light of the nation’s perceived wealth, but it “is still 
uncertain”27 if the interest was built on genuine concern as the once 
needed migrant worker population were the first to suffer the fallout of 
the downturn. Japan now finds it has to protect itself against unwanted 
criticisms from human rights “watchdogs”, such as the UNCHR. 
Peek argues that at the “core of the worldview of Japan’s political 
elite lies a strict interpretation of national sovereignty… the prior-
ity… is to defend internal practices against external pressures rather 
than actively seek out common interests”.28 In this sense, Japan argues 
that human rights are a domestic concern and are therefore beyond 
the mandate of the U.N. (The bureaucracy applied the same defence to 
many of the criticisms made by the U.N. Special Rapporteur in 2006.) 
Japan argues that it supports the basic principle of non-interference in 
domestic affairs, and this also may account for the government’s stance 
on what it perceives as “outside” reports on domestic matters. Histori-
cally, Japan has “responded defensively to human rights proposals at 
variance with Japanese law and practice” (my emphasis).29 However, 
Japan claims to support the universal principles of human and civil 
rights, democratization, and free and open economies. As a signatory to 
the human rights Covenants, it is difficult to consider how Japan can 
adopt such a negative position. It appears from Tokyo’s statements and 
inaction to enforce the Covenants, and, sadly, the judiciary’s current ap-
athy to “apparent” domestic human rights offences30 that Japan wants 
to be seen as supportive of human rights at the national level (which it 
does for “most” “Japanese” citizens), but it does not have the political 
will to enforce them at the regional or practical level, particularly for 
minorities and non-Japanese. The situation is ambiguous.
Japan’s position on human rights – both internationally and domes-
tically – has been driven by Japan’s desire for greater global political 
status and respect. This goal has become stronger as Japan has in-
creased its economic power in the world. As Onuma points out: without 
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the economic means to realise human rights, they remain paper-based 
myths and illusions, the salvation of the proletariat.31 Even if human 
rights and non-discrimination are guaranteed by the Constitution, and 
subsequently upheld by the judiciary, those people without the effec-
tive means to publicize human rights offences (for example, through the 
media) will be overwhelmed by those who have access to, and influence 
over the media. Mechanisms need to be established to provide effec-
tive economic, cultural and social means for all. Onuma claims that the 
steady progress of human rights in Japan has made the “classical di-
chotomy between ‘negative rights’ (civil and political rights) and ‘positive 
rights’ (economic, social and cultural rights) more relative, or even obso-
lete”.32 Whether this dichotomy has become obsolete is debatable as the 
evidence of discrimination against minorities and the nation’s failure to 
maintain Article 14(1) of the Constitution and its human rights treaties 
are continually tabled at the U.N.33 But why is this so?
Onuma outlines five points, which he claims have contributed to Ja-
pan’s low profile and inactivity on human rights issues. (i) Proselytizing 
for a high cause is alien to the Japanese as the culture is based on mod-
esty and proselytizing is seen as arrogant and uncivilised. (ii) “Legal-
istic” thinking is foreign to the Japanese. Although they worked hard 
to improve their economic, educational, cultural and social situation, it 
was never in terms of developing human rights. (iii) Diplomacy for the 
Japanese government meant nothing more than bilateral diplomacy – 
international order to be maintained between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union. (iv) Japan was not interested in human rights whilst it was 
developing an economically healthy state. The Japanese felt that given 
their history they should not take a leading role in the international so-
ciety politically, and a human rights portfolio was included in that role. 
(v) Japan’s failure to confront its war responsibilities burdened it with 
guilt that it could not take any lead in human rights. Japan feared that 
any stance on Korea or China would have led to a reciprocal harsh criti-
cism of its own history and domestic actions.34 
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Onuma’s reasons are partially valid but he is a little generous. (i) 
It is true that open proselytizing of many issues has not been practiced. 
Instead, the culture utilizes the practice of nemawashi, a technique 
used to avoid conflict and obtain consensus in decision-making by ma-
noeuvring behind the scenes without direct open confrontation.35 At 
election time, however, open proselytizing of the generally uniformed 
public blossoms like flowers on the cherry tree. (ii) Japan’s culture is 
based on the notion of kata – doing things in a prescribed manner. Kata 
forms the basis of nearly every aesthetic and social custom. Although 
it may be that Japan had no real open goal of improving individual 
human rights, throughout Japanese history, the ‘rights’ of individuals 
were based in strict cultural (legalistic) predictors, and after Edo, one of 
those was in economic terms. Moreover, legalistic thinking is applied to 
hinder “undesired” actions (such as manipulating Ministry guidelines 
to stop someone’s promotion or changing a system) or expedite a desired 
result. (iii~v) As stated above, Japanese diplomacy has been far from 
U.N.-centric as it has been generally consistent with a minimalist ap-
proach in the pursuit of national interests”.36 Simply put, Japan utilises 
a Liberal ideology to strengthen its Realist position.
I agree with those who highlight that “domestic controversy has 
been acute on such issues as nationality law, labour rights for public 
workers, the death penalty, women’s rights, minority rights… However, 
in contrast to the case against the United States, where resistance is 
strong against accepting meaningful international modifications of its 
national law, Japan has had relatively few public controversies over 
adhering to international human rights instruments once the policy has 
been decided by the government” (my emphasis).37 Japan’s realpolitik 
motivation is not primarily driven by the promotion of individual hu-
man rights: it is based on furthering its influence internationally. “That 
Japan had other interests in some of these situations, such as securing 
a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, does not detract from 
the reality of its support for democracy and civil rights in several situ-
ations”, but “the nature of domestic politics in Japan… [which] is domi-
nated by economic and security interests…”38  is a restraining factor 
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that disables Japan from addressing and incorporating greater concerns 
for human rights at home.
Human Rights At Home
One of the most indicting formal documents against Japan’s current 
domestic human rights situation has been the 2006 report by the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimi-
nation, xenophobia and related intolerance.39 In July 2005, the Special 
Rapporteur visited Japan where he met with “stakeholders in order to 
hear their views on the existence of racial discrimination and xenopho-
bia in Japan and on the measures taken to fight against it” (my empha-
sis).40 The Special Rapporteur argued that his mission to Japan was 
conducted pursuant to the mandate of the position he holds at the U.N.; 
however, this was rebutted by The Permanent Mission of Japan at the 
U.N. who argued that the Rapporteur’s mandate, is, according to U.N. 
document E/CN.4/RES/1994/164, to “examine incidents of contempo-
rary forms of racism, racial discrimination, any form of discrimination 
against Blacks, Arabs and Muslims, xenophobia, Negrophobia, anti-
Semitism, and related intolerance, as well as governmental measures to 
overcome them”.41 The Special Rapporteur concluded that “there is ra-
cial discrimination and xenophobia in Japan, and it affects three circles 
of discriminated groups: the national minorities – the Buraku people, 
the Ainu and the people of Okinawa; people and descendants of former 
Japanese colonies – Koreans and Chinese; foreigners and migrants from 
other Asian countries and from the rest of the world”42 and highlighted 
that the discrimination were of a social, economic, political, historical 
and cultural nature. The 2006 account is not dissimilar to previous re-
ports.43 The government of Japan has denied the accusations and stated 
that “Japan has taken all measures to combat racial discrimination”.44 
How can these seemingly polar positions be reconciled? How effec-
tively has Japan implemented and enforced its human rights policies 
domestically? Moreover, after China’s human rights debacle leading up 
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to and during the Olmypics, which was broadcast daily on news net-
works and over the Internet, surely questions should be raised about 
the appropriateness of Japan’s application to stage the event. 
Contrary to popular myth, Japan is not, and never has been, a 
mono-cultural society. The original people of Japan, the Ainu, have 
always had their own culture and traditions, but they have rarely 
been treated as a people with a valued culture and tradition. The elite 
in Japan also created a sub-class of people who became known as the 
burakumin, but are now often referred to as Dowa. These people liter-
ally became “untouchables” and lists still circulate with family names of 
Dowa people that are used as a guide to check whether a future spouse 
is from that cultural group.45 Japan’s colonial past records the nation’s 
importation of Koreans and Chinese with little regard to culture or hu-
man dignity. Koreans appear so similar to the Japanese that they are 
not easily recognisable; however, Japan’s historical military aggression 
against Korea, its annexation of Korea as a colony, the forced imple-
mentation of the Japanese writing system have created bitterness and 
prejudice that are very real today.46 (For those who believe that they 
are so well practised in cultural identification and separation, I would 
encourage you to take the plunge and visit alllooksame.com.) In modern 
times, the influx of foreign people into Japan has created a multicultur-
al appearance in some districts of Tokyo, Kobe, Osaka and elsewhere. 
However, Japan tries to keep its racial diversity to a minimum.47 “Both 
the Japanese and others perceive the social cohesion that results from 
this uniformity to be Japan’s strength. This notion of their homogeneity 
is, in fact, an illusion: there is a great deal of diversity within the coun-
try”.48 It might be timely to reconsider the abundance of examples that 
appear throughout history that when civilizations revert to xenophobic 
phobias economic downturns subsequently result.49 Can Japan afford to 
“bet against” this historical trend in the current economic climate?
Kerr argues that the Japanese are so cut off from meaningful con-
tact with people from other countries that they are unaware of ethnic or 
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national sensitivities, exampled by the racial slurs by politicians. One 
of the more off-handed remarks was by the Governor of Tokyo (who re-
fused to make time to meet the Special Rapporteur in 2005). The Gov-
ernor said: “atrocious crimes have been committed again and again by 
sangokujin [a derogatory term for foreigners] who have illegally entered 
Japan. We can expect them to riot in an earthquake”.50 How should we 
reconcile this racial slur and xenophobic speech from the man who lead 
Japan’s bid for the 2016 Olympic Games with the slogan “Uniting Our 
Worlds”? What should we then expect of all those sangokujin in Tokyo 
if during the Olympics the future expected Tokyo earthquake occurred? 
The Governor of Kanagawa has also shown his position: “all foreigners 
were sneaky thieves, although he later protested that he had meant 
only some foreigners”.51 The police openly practised discrimination 
during the 2008 G8 Summit in Toyako, Hokkaido, by systematically 
checking the identification (passport and alien registration cards) of 
only foreign-looking people on all arriving and departing international 
and domestic flights at Hokkaido airports. On one occasion, an Afri-
can student, who was waiting at the arrival lounge for his colleague 
to arrive from Tokyo, complained that he had been “interrogated” by 
the plain-clothes police. He reported that it was particularly insulting 
when the police found it surprising that he had a drivers’ licence and 
that Africans drove cars. Of course, a warning about the discriminatory 
practices was circulated on the Internet lessening the “shock” of being 
suddenly accosted by strangers (as one observer later commented: “who 
looked more like yakuza than police”) who lacked basic communication 
skills or the command of English or any second language. To provide a 
balanced account of the “police enthusiasm”, there are unsubstantiated 
reports on Internet blogs of police being reprimanded for their enthusi-
asm toward non-Japanese.52
Understandably, we could excuse such draconian acts on the need 
for security. This, however, overlooks two important points. Firstly, 
terrorism acts in Japan have been committed by Japanese and not by 
visiting guests. The Aum Shinrikyo’s gas attacks on the Tokyo subway 
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in 1995 and the Japanese Red Army’s hijacking in the 1970s spring 
readily to mind. Secondly, the acts are not isolated incidents that are 
enforced during periods when security of the state is paramount. I can 
personally attest to encountering “friendly discrimination” by the police 
after riding a mountain bicycle about 15 kilometres up a 1000 metre 
hill. The junior officer was indeed somewhat apologetic, as he had been 
ordered by one of the four other police officers, who had driven up the 
mountain in their car, to check my identification. Had the mere act 
and context not been so comical I may have taken offence. (As a note 
to say that I understand this is not a Japan-only phenomenon I have 
experienced something similar, but more volatile, in Switzerland.) But, 
how do we also account for Tokyo-based gendarmes who have developed 
the habit of checking foreign-looking Waseda students? On one occa-
sion, the girl was Japanese, but the police officer had trouble reconcil-
ing this fact as she had “English textbooks in her bag”. In a separate 
case, another girl was harassed for her Alien Registration Card until 
she in frustration screamed at the officer that she was Japanese, at 
which point he profusely apologised. But, you must ask yourself, why 
was she harangued so vehemently because of a belief that she was not 
Japanese? And, furthermore, what does the apology (of embarrassment) 
for the racial harassment that he had just displayed to “one of his own 
kind” reflect in the officer’s thought processes? But, if we are to under-
stand the concern of these officials, we need to examine the facts. 
Statistics show that in 2003, there was a 17% increase in crime and 
offences committed by foreigners in Japan; but Japan’s foreign popu-
lation is increasing at a rate of about 45% over the past 10 years. Of 
these cases, more than 56% were “offences” (visa overstays, drug use, 
speeding, prostitution, etc) not criminal acts. We also know that Japa-
nese citizens are also guilty of the same offences (such as the media-
sensational marijuana cases within the Sumo fraternity). The rate of 
Japanese committing “crime” (murder, rape, arson, kidnapping, rob-
bery, etc) is .340%, slightly more than the average Asian rate at .314%. 
The Korean rate is .086%, the lowest from all Asian countries, with 
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Oceanians at .0044% the lowest rate of all cultural groups.53 It seems, 
therefore, that the Japanese actual crime rate is ten times higher than 
those from Western countries, and is higher than “Asians” - data that 
are conveniently overlooked and under reported by the media and 
political elite. Kerr argues that “the media (newspaper, cinema, and 
television) portray Japan as the victim of dangerous foreigners, and 
business cartels raise high barriers to prevent outsiders from gaining 
a foothold”.54 When the media report on a crime or offence committed 
by a non-Japanese, the media ensures that “foreigner” is mentioned, 
although the same delivery method is not followed for other cases. The 
same pattern is not often recognisable for crimes and offences that are 
committed by Japanese citizens outside Japan and such acts go com-
pletely unreported in mainstream media. A survey conducted in 2004 
found that more than a third of Japanese respondents said they did 
not want more foreigners coming to Japan, even as short-term visitors. 
There was almost unanimous agreement on the reason: a fear of crime.55 
The negative portrayal presented by the political and bureaucratic elite 
through the media, especially of the Korean population, is misguided and 
unfounded. 
Many Koreans were “encouraged” to relocate to Japan and to its 
northern island, Hokkaido, and other remote areas prior to WWII under 
the lure of escaping poverty – a similar reason accounts for why many 
Japanese left Hokkaido for North and South America. At the time, the 
government required that the land be registered – which, ironically, 
had previously belonged to the Ainu – but as the Koreans knew whose 
land was whose many were remiss and did not register their land. 
Later, the Japanese government simply took over the “non-registered” 
land, akin to previous actions against the Ainu. 
In the 15th century, the Japanese first began to move onto the land 
of the Ainu people. It was after the Meiji Restoration that the central 
government began to utilise Hokkaido more actively and adopted an 
official policy “of assimilation of the Ainu and expropriated their land, 
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so that the society and culture was fatally damaged”.56 A “mono-ethnic 
nation” approach was adopted, but in 1997 a law for the “promotion” 
of Ainu culture was enacted. The Law seeks to promote research in 
Ainu culture, language and traditions but it “does not touch upon the 
promotion of their human rights”.57 The government seems unable – or 
unwilling, at the very least – to recognise specific rights for indigenous 
peoples because it believes such action would breach the Japanese Con-
stitution, which guarantees equality for all “Japanese” before the law.58 
The Ainu believe that “they are among the few indigenous peoples in 
the world who have no land recognised as their indigenous land”.59 For 
example, shared property (e.g. real estate) was controlled in Hokkaido 
by the kyudojin hogoho (Natives Protection Law) of 1899, which sort 
to assimilate the Ainu by granting them plots of (their) land to make 
them into farmers. This law (abrogated in 1997) gave six times less 
land to the Ainu as “Japanese” people who also moved to Hokkaido.60 It 
is believed that the Ainu now only live on 10% of their ancestral land: 
limiting their access to their traditional way of life and putting them in 
“a position of dependence on the public authorities in the access to their 
alimentary resources”.61 The Ainu want recognition in the 1997 Law of 
their status as the indigenous people and the promotion of their rights 
in accord with international law. Tokyo did not respond to the claims 
made by the Special Rapporteur against the Japanese government on 
Ainu issues. 
The Japanese government actively developed policies to suppress 
Korean62 and Ainu63 identity, and has tried to eliminate their culture. 
Korean names were replaced by Japanese equivalents, the Korean 
language was forbidden, and the Korean schools in Japan were never 
given due recognition. In 1952, when U.S. occupation formerly ended 
under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese revoked any rights 
resident Koreans had, and Koreans were suddenly treated as foreigners 
under the Alien Registration Law.64 This law required the fingerprint-
ing of all non-Japanese residents; this was amended in 1987, and again 
in the 1990s to rescind the fingerprinting of foreigners, but this has 
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since been reintroduced under “security measures” following the “Real-
ist hype” created by the G.W. Bush administration on terrorism. Suzuki 
and Oiwa quote Jesse Jackson, who wrote to Japan’s Justice Minster 
in 1987 to state that “Japan’s Alien Registration Law… is reminiscent 
of the pass laws in South Africa… As an economic giant, there is much 
to be respected, but no nation should have an economic surplus and a 
moral deficit”.65 According to Article 13 of the Alien Registration Law, 
foreigners are still required to carry their Alien Registration Card at all 
times and are required to produce it to immigration inspectors or police 
officials if requested. This is the excuse that the officials use for their 
spot checks. 
To understand why the Korean population feels particularly ag-
grieved and insulted by the Japanese government’s apparent apathy, 
one only has to recall the 1995 claim by then Foreign Minister Michio 
Watanabe that Korea willingly handed over its sovereignty to Japan. 
South Korean Prime Minister Lee Hong Koo said: “Our government and 
all the people of our nation cannot help showing shock and concern… 
The remarks are outside the bounds of common knowledge by a per-
son in a leading position in Japan poses a big problem… to our future-
oriented efforts to build an Asia-Pacific community”.66 This different 
understanding reflects all the same contentious historical issues as they 
are taught through official textbooks in the region. The Koreans’ educa-
tional plight in Japan is another example of non-equal opportunity.
In 2003, The Ministry of Education (MEXT) encouraged all univer-
sities to adopt more liberal policies toward students from international 
and ethnic high schools in Japan. In 2005, a university in Osaka was 
accused of racial discrimination for allegedly telling a high-achieving 
Korean student who was about to graduate from an ethnic Korean 
school to “not even bother to apply for early admission on recommenda-
tion”.67 The university argued that her rejection was because her high 
school was not accredited as a high school under Japanese law. Another 
university, which also limits applications to Japanese students, sug-
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gested that the Osaka-based university’s decision was probably rea-
sonable - but not on the grounds previously outlined: “Expanding such 
opportunities has just started, and schools probably cannot afford to 
review the recommendation systems yet”.68 But, in 2007, a Yokohama-
based university refused a Korean student entry under the grounds 
that the Korean school was not registered with the government.69 This 
suggests that the universities are using MEXT’s 2003 decision (to give 
individual institutions autonomy to decide whether to let graduates of 
ethnic schools take university entrance exams without a high school 
equivalency certificate) as their escape clause – as outlined above, us-
ing “legalistic” ambiguities to suit the outcome desired. This is not dis-
similar to previous experiences of the liberalisation of the law for the 
employment of non-Japanese faculty at public universities. The reality 
is, put simply, the political will to change the status quo is lacking. 
Suzuki and Oiwa capture the heart of the Koreans in their ethno-
graphic study in the following comment: “Zainichi is the basis of my ex-
istence. When you take the broadest sense of the word, which literally 
means ‘being in Japan, even the Japanese are zainichi. But they take 
it for granted that they live in Japan. So zainichi is a word that has no 
meaning to them. This makes them Japanese. Between those like us 
who have to be conscious of the fact that they are living in Japan and 
those who take it for granted, there is a huge gap. We are children of 
those who were forced to be apart from their native land. This is why 
zainichi is important for us”.70 “Many resident Koreans feel that chang-
ing nationality and becoming Japanese would be like a surrender to the 
Japanese demand to deny their ethnic origins and cultural background 
and ‘forget’ what happened to them in the past”.71 
The Special Rapporteur outlined several additional cases of human 
rights violations against the Koreans in Japan. One included the case 
of the people living in the Utoro district who have been ordered by the 
Supreme Court to relocate (the land has been bought from the original 
owner by a real estate company). The Koreans “feel they are the victims 
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first of colonialism and war, thereafter of discrimination and exclusion, 
and most recently of real estate speculation: their basic rights have been 
violated for over 60 years”. Another human rights problem referred to 
was the lack of access to the pension: 72 a system that is discriminatory 
in design. In the simplest of terms, the government requires all people 
to contribute to the system for at least 25 years before any pension can 
be paid. However, should a person fail to do so, s/he cannot receive the 
pension. This is an equitable arrangement. A problem arises if or when 
an individual leaves the system, such as a migrant worker leaving the 
country. The contributions that the worker has paid to the system are 
not returned except for approximately the first three years of contribu-
tions, or about ¥1,000,000 (about US$10,000). The balance remains in 
the government’s purse. This equates to an additional tax levied upon 
many non-Japanese. For the fortunate few whose country has reciprocal 
pension arrangements, the “tax” is lessened. For approximately 70,000 
Koreans, the discrimination is worse as they were prevented from even 
joining the system and are now ineligible to receive a pension. A similar 
situation is faced by many Japanese-Brazilians who are finding it dif-
ficult to find companies that will pay the employer’s share of pension 
premiums,73 and since the economic downturn, many are finding social 
benefits even more difficult to secure any reasonable life (although this 
is also true for many Japanese citizens).
The Japanese government did not offer any response to the Rappor-
teur’s claims on pension discrimination. The government implied that it 
is not willing to interfere or to act. For many Koreans, “they and their 
offspring are the victims of genocide, slave-like practice, forced transpor-
tation due to Japan’s aggressive war and its colonial rule of Korea, and 
are “victims of grave human rights violations” according to the “Study 
Concerning Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Right and Fundamental Free-
doms” (E/CN.4Sub.2/1993/8). Paragraph 137 of the report, which was 
adopted by the 1994 Human Rights Commission, suggests that preferen-
tial rehabilitation treatment for these victims”74 should be forthcoming. 
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“Racial discrimination is practised undisturbed, but in no case have 
the public authorities prosecuted [offenders]… Apart from a personal 
unwillingness to do so, the reason is their inability to prosecute… on 
the basis of national law…”.75 The Special Rapporteur noted that the 
manifestations of racial discrimination and xenophobia are manifold 
and that they are of economic and political nature (his emphasis) and 
are of a cultural and historical nature.76 Japan has, as would be expect-
ed, denied many of the claims of racial discrimination and xenophobia 
leading to human rights offences. It argues that “the purpose of Ar-
ticle 14 of the Constitution is interpreted as extending to the relations 
among private citizens through the provisions of the Civil Code... there 
are cases in which the courts judged that the acts of private citizens 
were invalid because of discrimination”.77 This does not seem to be con-
sistent with the current judiciary’s attitude78 or the reality of many mi-
norities in Japan. Nor does it seem to be consistent with international 
human rights Covenants to which Japan is signatory. Moreover, it is 
difficult to reconcile the Court’s and the prevailing Bureaucracies belief 
that the Constitution should only be read as applicable to Japanese 
citizens when it clearly states in Article 14(1) that “All of the people are 
equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, 
economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or 
family origin…”. I reiterate: it seems illogical to believe that at the time 
of drafting the Constitution, the writers could have had any other un-
derstanding that race meant “groups that humans can be divided into 
according to the colour of their skin and physical features”.79 Even at 
the bare minimum, this would have included the Koreans, the Ainu and 
any other group of people in Japan at the time.
Conclusion and Way Forward
Human rights do put Japan in an awkward position. It is unfair 
and erroneous to portray Japan as a country where human rights abus-
es akin to previous apartheid policies of South Africa, or those of some 
of its Asian neighbours, abound. At the same time, much remains to be 
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done to complete the transition to an open society where minorities and 
multiculturalism is both respected and promoted at all levels. The prob-
lem is, obviously, far more complex than I have been able to do justice 
to in this short paper. Many of the difficulties experienced by the Dowa, 
resident migrant workers, women80, etc. have not been discussed. As 
Chieko Nohno stated, it is undeniable that progress in gender equality 
has been slow by international standards, despite the country’s high 
education and development levels as gender roles remain entrenched 
and it is difficult for women to balance work and family life with women 
having little support for professional advancement81. She went on to 
highlight that Japan’s actions to improve gender equality are starting 
to become apparent. 
Human rights in Japan is a myriad web of intrigue that brings into 
play historical, economic, political, cultural and social vectors that can-
not be merely undone overnight. The inter- and intra-relationships of 
these vectors make any investigation on the Japanese, let alone human 
rights, difficult to unravel. Much more could be, and needs to be said. 
This responsibility rests with the academics, the public figures and the 
media.
Japan has in many ways adhered to its human rights responsibili-
ties domestically, although, specifically toward minority groups, such 
as the Ainu and Koreans, there is still much it can do. I believe that 
prominent figures could do more for those (Japanese or otherwise) who 
do suffer the indignities that the negative sides of culture, history, 
politics and economics bring. Has Japan adhered to Article 14(1) of the 
Japanese Constitution, especially in regard to the Ainu people and resi-
dent Koreans? Has it adhered to its obligations to international human 
rights Covenants? The answers to the questions are not simple. Japan 
is far more generous on human rights issues than any of its Asian 
neighbours; but it still lags on some issues. The aggrieved have a right 
to complain as Japan is signatory to international human rights pro-
cesses. Japan should, as must the “West”, be accountable and uphold 
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its responsibilities. Japan has so far failed to effectively address many 
domestic human rights issues; but it has been a major economic power 
for more than 25 years and has one of the highest ratios of tertiary-
educated people in the world - with more than 50% of high school leav-
ers attending university in 2005.82 I believe that Japan could become an 
example to emulate, but it will only achieve this if the complex systems 
are allowed to be unravelled and rebuilt – not on any purely “Western” 
model (heaven forbid!), but on a Constructivist global model that high-
lights both the unique culture and history of the country and all its 
people, and welcomes an emerging future of interdependence.
It would be remiss to critique Japan’s human rights without offer-
ing some, albeit simplified, positive steps Japan could take to enhance 
the human rights freedoms it endorses. From the outset, I totally reject 
the argument that is often used in defence of maintaining the status 
quo: “no other country does it so why should Japan?” It is not whether 
someone else has done, or not done, x or y, it is about leadership, cred-
ibility, and honouring commitments to human kind. I personally wish 
other states would also correct some of their human rights oversights, 
but this does not excuse Japan from failing to adhere to its responsibili-
ties. “Everyone else was looting, Your Honour, so why couldn’t I?”
The Tokyo elite need to adopt a more open and receptive ear to un-
derstanding the human rights situation in Japan. To achieve this will 
mean that the power of the “bureaurcratic law maker” be reduced and 
replaced by a community-incorporated forward-looking team of special-
ists who have both experience in Japan’s private sector, and in Inter-
governmental agencies (such as the U.N. or the I.C.R.C.) for an ex-
tended period. Professional and life-time public servants are necessary, 
but they alone are by no means sufficient or satisfactory and many are 
crippling Japan’s capability to move forward in times of crises. Japan 
needs to recognise that any critique of its human rights record is an 
opportunity for it to show global leadership. Simply put, Japan should 
recognise the opportunity to convert its rhetoric into real action so other 
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states can also see the possibilities and follow the lead. The alternative: 
remain the second poor cousin to the big states and sink further into 
the shadow of mistrust from its closest neighbours.
A second undertaking would be the recognition of the Ainu and 
other indigeneous peoples of Japan as the first peoples and make a 
greater effort in achieving their attributal cultural and civil rights in 
accordance with international law. Japan would neither be the first 
state nor alone in taking such action. Canada, New Zealand, and more 
recently Australia, have all made much progress working with their 
“first peoples”.
The discrimination against the Dowa in any form should carry more 
severe penalties. Unless the Dowa choose to remain outside the rights 
attributed to the “Japanese”, any act of discrimination should be severly 
dealt with and supported by the full weight of the law. The experience 
of my “sempai”, whose father refused to support the idea of marriage 
to his then girlfirend because she was identified with a heritage from 
Dowa culture needs to be eliminated from the society. Japan is a pro-
gressive modern society where tolerance is slowly being promoted from 
within. The Dowa concerns are a stigma that is purely a “domestic is-
sue” and the elite need to resolve this lingering issue so the nation can 
move forward. 
Similarly, greater effort should be applied to reducing the gender 
gap in Japan, commencing immediately with equal salary, working 
conditions and future promotions for women. Although much progress 
has been made over the past ten years in creating better employment 
conditions for women, discrimination and harassment is still rife. Real-
istically, it may simply mean that men need to be retrained – to be re-
programmed – so they can adjust to the new realities of modern societ-
ies (and future ones, too). Economically, it does not make any sense to 
discriminate against half of a country’s pool of creative talent. Surely 
this is just another form of “brain drain”? As purely observational data 
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based on personal experience, more than two-thirds of the work that I 
have considered of excellence have been created by women.
Zainichi Koreans should be given equal status as those enjoyed by 
“Japanese” citizens. This would include at the very least the termina-
tion of the Alien Registration Card, an acknowledgement of the past 
wrongs, the right to be promoted beyond manager level in the public 
service, the right to vote at all levels, and actively support a more inte-
grative system between Korean and Japanese educational institutions 
in Japan. Moreover, the elite few who manipulate the “history” of Japan 
and its neighbours need to be replaced with historians who understand 
that “true history” is a represenation of the combined understanding of 
the past. Failure to achieve this will continue to hamper development 
and trust within the region – and that should be reason enough alone if 
these elite are alturistic in their goals for a better Japan.
The Alien Registration Card is an historical xenophobic antique, 
reminiscent of Hitler’s identity cards that the Jews were forced to carry. 
I am not advocating the abolishment of an identification system, such 
as a legitimate visa, but I do support the idea that the Alien Registra-
tion Card be either terminated or be used in place of a visa (and Re-
Entry permit). There is no defensible reason for the government to 
demand its foreign guests to possess both – other than burdening its 
guests with another tax for the pleasure of helping develop the intellec-
tual and industrial potential of the country. A valid Japanese driver’s 
licence (or “proof-of-age” card) should be sufficient for identification pur-
poses – much as it is for “Japanese” citizens. A valid passport and visa 
are required to obtain the licence in the first place! Should the Tokyo 
elite stubbornly believe that an Alien Registration Card is essential, it 
should only be used for visa-related purposes (such as for re-entry, ex-
tending stay, etc.) and not for identification. Moreover, once “permanent 
residency” status has been granted, the Alien Registration Card should 
be redundant as all the benefits enjoyed by the “Japanese” should be 
applied equally to the permanent non-Japanese member of society. 
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(I will not enter into the “right-to-vote” discussion here other than to 
state that I believe that non-Japanese with permanent residency status 
should be allowed to vote in local elections.)
Japan is a multicultural society. This is particularly evident in the 
major urban areas. The law enforcement agencies need to be retrained 
in their “openess” and “communicative” skills toward non-Japanese 
members of society. The inconsistent policies (“Three Monkey’s ap-
proach”) toward “obvious” suspicious elements in certain parts of 
Tokyo’s night districts and the over zealous requests toward the “un-
Japanese” types in the community need to be corrected. The police have 
a difficult task; but they do not make their lot any easier by ignorance. 
My experiences with the Japanese police on most other issues - other 
than human rights issues - have left me with nothing but admiration. I 
wish the same could be said about race-related matters. 
Similarly, Japan needs to cease the self-deluding excuses perpetu-
ated amongst the people that “we are an isolated or small island”, “we 
aren’t used to foreigners”, amongst other pat refrains from the book of 
101 excuses. At a recent camping trip in Hokkaido, my colleagues’ son 
drew more attention and fascination from co-bathers than the sumo 
fraternity attracted – who happened to be bathing at the same time. 
A similar experience also occurred when I was swimming with my 
daughter at a local pool. Five to six elementary school children mulled 
around like crocodiles waiting for potential prey to falter. On their third 
“assault” I reprimanded the children, who swam away giggling emba-
rassment. After 15 years in Japan, the “no-one wants to sit next to the 
foreigner on the train” seems to have progressed little. Unfortunately, 
Japan remains childish in its development on many facets in modern 
life. Greater emphasis should be directed at re-educating the masses – 
even if it means changing the Japanese language to achieve it. 
Finally, the Japanese media needs to be more accountable in the 
way it presents news and information. The sad reality is that many in 
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Japan are unable to evaluate and question the information provided by 
checking it against other sources and experiences. The national carrier, 
NHK, particularly, must not represent only Tokyo’s position, nor pres-
ent the news in ways that seek to promote one group as “intelligent” 
over another. (I particularly refer to NHK’S production technique of 
dubbing foreign – usually English – speakers with Japanese, whilst 
during the same interview, providing Japanese subtitles for the Japa-
nese reporters who are interviewing in that other language). The repre-
sentation of crime should also be reported according to the facts with-
out the added racial stereotyping that is weaved into the stories. The 
media needs to re-educate the people continually, not by allowing non-
Japanese or biculturals to acquire “talento” status, which in some cases 
further excacerbates the stereotypes, but by a process of “desensitizing” 
the community to the “gaijin phenomenon”. Japan is a modern and de-
veloped country in a global community and its people need to start rec-
ognising that fact. And the media needs to take the lead!
As a long-term permanent resident in Japan, I appreciate that it 
is difficult to find a balance between respect and rights, tolerance and 
action. It is not unusual to experience “friendly discrimination” from 
local police. It is hard to forget the xenophobic attacks; and equally, 
the humbling generosity that I have encountered. I am most annoyed 
by those who come to Japan to “take” and not to “partake”; but I am 
equally shocked by non-Japanese residents who have public voice but 
state so casually: “I am an ‘apologist for discrimination in order to pro-
tect Japanese culture’… overall great toleration is shown to foreigners, 
despite the many problems they cause here.”83 Such comments reveal a 
complete ignorance of the evidence, and about notions of “culture” – let 
alone understanding the variety of “cultures” within Japan. It further-
more gives credence to the small, but powerful number of policy makers 
that vigorously uphold a “One Japan” mono-cultural approach. Most of 
the “Japanese” I have met, or have taught, at first thought the picture 
I painted was that of another “urusai gaijin (noisy foreigner)”, but after 
they examined the facts they recognised that Japan is not as innocent 
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as they expected and it needs to change. It is a shame that the Tokyo 
elites dictate a human rights policy that does not address the future 
because they are living in past fears. Japan’s future economic prosper-
ity and creativity will depend on its social flexibilities and human rights 
policies. For my daughter’s futures, and those of our students, I hope Ja-
pan accepts the leadership challenge and unravels the web of intrigue.
References and Notes
1 Peek, John, M. (1992). Japan, the United Nations, and Human Rights. Asian Survey, 
32/3, , p. 217-229, Institute of International Studies, University of California
2 ibid. p.222
3 ibid. (5) p.223
4 Kawasaki, Taro. (2006). NGOS call for action against racism. Asahi Shimbun, 8th 
March, 2006 
5 Yokota, Yozo & Aoi, Chiyuki. (2000). Japan’s foreign policy towards human rights: Un-
certain changes. In David P. Forsythe (Ed.) Human Rights and Comparative Foreign 




9 Arudou, Debito. (2004). Japanese Only, Akashi Shoten Inc, Tokyo
10 Hadfield, Peter. (2000). Special for USA TODAY, USA Today, March 8, 2000, p. 24A
11 Op Cit. 
12 Japan Times. (2005). City off hook over bathhouse barring of foreigners, Japan Times, 
April 8, 2005 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20050408a4.htm
13 See Endnote cf.19, endnote 21, Yokota, Yozo & Aoi, Chiyuki. (2000)., and Amnesty In-
ternational Reports
14 Ueki, Yasuhiro (1993). Japan’s UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism. In 
Gerald L. Curtis (Ed.), Japan’s foreign policy after the Cold War: coping with change. 
Studies of the East Asian Institute, p.347-48
15 ibid. p.349, quotes Ministry of Foreign Affairs, waga gaiko no kinkyo, 1958, Vol.2 p.171
16 ibid p.347
17 ibid. p.349-350
18 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Sub-Commission on the Pro-
motion and Protection of Human Rights, 58th Session, Administration of Justice, Rule of 
Law and Democracy, Written statement submitted by the Japanese Workers’ Committee 
for Human Rights (JWCHR), a NGO in special consultative status, 8 August 2006, A/
HRC/Sub.1/58/NGO/3 p.4
19 Op Cit.
20 Refer to Supreme Court of Japan Case Heisei 10-93 for decision and background http://
www.courts.go.jp/search/jhsp0030?action_id=dspDetail&hanreiSrchKbn=01&hanreiNo=
25075&hanreiKbn=01
21 ibid. Yokota, Yozo & Aoi, Chiyuki. (2000) p.122
22 Yasumoto, Dennis. (1995). The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy, Mac-
73
Waseda Global Forum No. 6, 2009, 47–74
Millan Press Ltd: London, (4) p.15
23 ibid. Peek, John, M. (1992). p.220, 221
24 ibid. Ueki, Yasuhiro (1993) p.351
25 Op Cit.
26 Op Cit.
27 ibid. Yokota, Yozo & Aoi, Chiyuki. (2000). p.115
28 ibid. Peek, John, M. (1992). p.217
29 Op Cit. 
30 See Supreme Court Decision Otaru Onsen Case, 2006, www.debito.org/otarusupreme-
court.html 
31 Onuma Yasuaki. (1997). In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights: Universal vs. 
Relative Human Rights Viewed From and Asian Perspective. In Daniel Warner (Ed.), 
Human rights and humanitarian law: the quest for universality. p.43-78, Nijhoff Law 
Specials, Springer, London
32 Op Cit. p.53
33 See Endnote 20, and United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Hu-
man Rights, 59th Session, Indigenous Issues: Human rights and indigenous issues – 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, E/CN.4/2003/90/ADD.1, 21 Janu-
ary 2003;
 United Nations General Assembly, 61st session, Combating racism, racial discrimina-
tion, xenophobia and related intolerance and comprehensive implementation of and 
follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, Nore by the Secretary-
General, 17th September, 2006, p.16;
 United Nations International covenant on civil and political rights, Human Rights Com-
mittee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, CCPR/C/79?Add.102, 19th November, 1998, as examples.
34 Op Cit. p.54-55
35 Kodansha (1996) Keys to the Japanese Heart and Soul, Kodansha, Tokyo p. 129
36 ibid. Onuma Yasuaki. (1997). p.347
37 ibid. Yokota, Yozo & Aoi, Chiyuki. (2000). p.123
38 ibid. p.141
39 See Endnote 20 above.
40 Op Cit. p.5
41 ibid. United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 1st Session, Agenda 
item 4, Implementation of General assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15th March 2006 En-
titled “Human Rights Council”, Endnote 20, p.2
42 ibid. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 62nd 
Session, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and all Forms of Discrimination, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimina-
tion, xenophobia and related intolerance: Mission to Japan, p.2
43 See Endnote 33
44 Op Cit. Endnote 41, p.2
45 ibid. Endnote 21 p.11
46 Suzuki, David & Oiwa, Keibo. (1996). The Korean Mirror, The Japan We Never Knew: A 
Journey of Discovery, p. 159-186, Stoddart, Toronto, p.161
47 ibid. p.159
48 ibid. p.160
49 Chua, Amy. (2007). Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance – and 
Why They Fall, Doubleday: New York
74
Malcolm H. FIELD：Human Rights in Japan –intriguing, progressing, but still lacking
50 Kerr, Alex. (2001). Dogs and Demons: Tales from the Dark Side of Japan, Hill & Wang, 
New York, p.352
51 McCurry, Justin. (2004). Suspicious minds, The Guardian, 10 March 2004
52 See http://pontasmemorandum.blogspot.com/2008/05/voices-surpressed-on-debito-org.
html
53 Maciamo, (2004). Foreign criminality in Japan, Japan Reference, www.jref.com/society/
foreign_crime_in_japan.shtml, sited 17 January 2007
54 Op Cit. Kerr, Alex. (2001).
55 Op Cit. McCurry, Justin. (2004).
56 ibid. Endnote 21, p.5, p.9
57 Op Cit.
58 Op Cit.
59 ibid. Endnote 21, p.14
60 ibid. p.13
61 Op Cit.
62 ibid. Suzuki, David & Oiwa, Keibo. (1996). p.163
63 ibid. Endnote 21, p.9
64 ibid. p.165
65 ibid. p.166
66 Quoted from Suzuki, David & Oiwa, Keibo. (1996). p.169
67 Konishi, Yoshiaki. (2005). University bars student of Korean school from special screen-
ing, Asahi Shimbun, 11th September, 2005
68 Op Cit.
69 Asahi Shimbun. (2007). Tokyo: University denies Korea school student. Asahi Shimbun, 
January 19th, 2007
70 ibid. Suzuki, David & Oiwa, Keibo. (1996). p.179
71 ibid. p.167
72 ibid. Endnote 21, p.14-16
73 Yoshitake, Yu. (2006). No net: Aging Japanese-Brazilians fall outside public pensions. 
Asahi Shimbun, 16th August 2006
74 Choe Hong Ryul. (1998) Report to UNESCO on Human Rights Violations, Submitted by 
the Union of Korean Teachers and School Clerks in Japan (representative and Chair-
man), May 28, 1998
75 ibid. endnote 21, p.17-18
76 Op Cit. p18
77 ibid. Endnote 22, p.3
78 See Supreme Court Decision Otaru Onsen Case, endnote 30
79 Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English
80 See United Nations document CEDAW/C/JPN/6, Consideration of Reports submitted by 
States parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women, Sixth periodic report of States parties – Japan, 8 September 
2008. 
81 United Nations, General Assembly document WOM/172, Committee on Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, Japan tells Women’s Anti-discrimination Committee 
efforts to meet Treaty obligations bearing fruit, but progress slow by international stan-
dards, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/wom1742.doc.htm
82 Ministry of Education, MEXT. (2005) School Education, Japan’s Education at a Glance, 
MEXT: Japan, http://www.mext.go.jp/english/statist/05101901/005.pdf
83 Clark, Gregory (2005). Views on anti-discrimination, GregoryClark.Net, sited January 
31st, 2007
